Vol. 14 No. 3 (March 2004)
A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE by Max M. Edling. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
352 pp. Hardback $35.00. £30.00. ISBN: 0-19-514870-3.
Reviewed by Rick A. Swanson, Department of Political Science,
University of Louisiana at Lafayette. Email: ras2777@louisiana.edu
Given concerns over the "military-industrial complex" and
"big government" in the latter half of the 20th Century, and especially
given debates over the proper balance between liberty and security since
the terror attacks of 9-11, Edling's book is particularly timely. He begins by noting that at the time of
the founding of the United States, "states in this period did little besides
waging war and raising money" (p.8).
Offering a new, different interpretation of the Federalist-Antifederalist
debates, he "propose[s] that the debate is best seen as a debate about state
formation" (p.11) that was "largely concerned with military and fiscal matters"
(p.8). However, given the strong
current of anti-statist thought by the new American political culture, Edling's
"central question" is "How was the national government to exercise its newly
won fiscal-military powers without exerting undue influence on the citizens,
thereby challenging their anti-statist perceptions?" (p.10). Edling divides
his book into three parts: The ratification debates in general, and then
greater focus, first on the military clauses, and then the fiscal clauses
of the U.S. Constitution. He states that he has three audiences
in mind-political and constitutional theorists and historians who study
the founding period, persons studying American political development, and
comparativists who study state formation in general.
Chapter One notes that the ratification debates both establish
the legitimacy of the U.S. Constitution and help us to determine the meaning
of its text. Chapter Two explains
that prior attempts to characterize the Federalist-Antifederalist debates
as essentially conflicts between "aristocratic" and "democratic" ideals
or as between "liberalism" and "classical republicanism" have failed in
their efforts to explain the fundamental differences between the Federalist
and Anti-Federalist positions. Instead,
Edling sees Antifederalists as espousing a view inherited from earlier English
thinkers-what he calls "Country thought": "To Country thinkers, the world was locked
in a conflict between power and liberty. Only two actors were cast in this drama: the rulers, who were
agents of power, and the ruled, who were agents of liberty" (p.40). "State formation" or "state building"
is "the building up of military force by the extraction of men and money
from society" (p.46) but this means the state must "subjugate" or "coopt"
(p.46) citizens opposing this. Thus,
the Antifederalists highly feared the U.S. government's ability to have
standing armies and its unlimited right to tax and create public debt.
Chapter Three documents how the "fiscal-military state" (p.48) rose in Europe between 1500 and 1800. Edling concludes the chapter by noting "The dilemma faced by the Federalists was therefore how to create a state possessing sufficient strength to withstand the 'fiscal-military states' of Europe, despite the widespread aversion to a strong central government among the American people" (p.57). Chapter Four discusses how the early Americans were fully aware of the rise of the fiscal-military state in Europe, and thus were also aware of the need for a new United States to be able to defend itself militarily against other nations. The disagreement between Federalists and Antifederalists was over how much power a central government could possess without endangering liberty.
European history and thought greatly informed these debates,
and Edling continues to weave this information throughout the remainder
of the book.
Chapters Five through Nine comprise part II, which considers
military powers. Chapter
Five discusses the American military experience under the Continental Congress
and the subsequent Articles of Confederation. The difficulties the U.S. government had in creating, maintaining,
and deploying a military revealed how impotent the U.S. was, and led to
numerous calls for increased military powers in the new U.S. Constitution.
Chapter Six details the Antifederalist's attempts to place various
restrictions on the national government's military powers; especially limits
on, or a complete prohibition of, standing armies in peacetime.
However, the Federalists responded that peacetime strength provided
protection for, not a threat to, liberty, because a weak nation could not
deter invasion and thus could not fulfill its obligations under the social
contract to protect the people's natural rights.
Chapter Seven details the basic Anti-federalist arguments against
the military powers of the new national government. Primarily, they argued a national government with the power
to have forces during peacetime, while also controlling the states' citizen-militias,
would build up the standing army while either neglecting or exhausting the
state militias until the latter became a negligible force. Then, the national army would be able
to coerce obedience to laws that did not have popular consent and would
be able to defeat the neglected or abused citizen-militias. Chapter Eight
provides the Federalist responses to these arguments.
Primarily, they argued any standing army would necessarily be small
and not involved with ordinary citizens. Most day-to-day enforcement of
laws would be the responsibility of local and state administrators. Moreover,
the U.S. could not afford a large standing army, and only a small force
would be needed given the geographic isolation of the U.S. from the European
powers. What little force did exist would probably be stationed along the
Western frontier, well away from the majority of the population. The federalists
did argue, however, that a professional standing army or "select militia"
would be needed to fight against any trained foreign army, and also because
most of the regular militia would be needed to provide ordinary labor, primarily
agricultural labor. Chapter Nine examines Federalist military decisions
in the early years of the new Republic.
Edling concludes "In the end, Federalist policies proved every Antifederalist
prediction wrong" (p.135). In
fact, "By comparative standards, the American republic possessed an exceptionally
small army well into the twentieth Century" (p.138) and was rarely used
against civilians until the labor strikes of the 1890's.
Chapters 10-14 comprise part III, which considers fiscal
powers. Chapter 10 documents
how under the Articles of Confederation, the States declined most Congressional
requisitions, and even when they wished to comply, taxes imposed by the
states (primarily land taxes) faced widespread and strong opposition from
people (primarily farmers), who could not afford the taxes. Without power to tax, Congress overprinted its own currency
in an attempt to pay off its loans and debts, making the currency worthless.
Congress was in total insolvency by 1787, and had destroyed any faith
the American public or foreign nations had in its credit. Chapter Eleven
explains that despite clear need to allow the national government the power
to tax, the Antifederalists argued for many limitations to be placed on
Congress's unlimited power to tax found in the proposed Constitution. Perhaps
taxes could be placed only on imports and exports but not domestic trade,
or direct internal taxes could be used only as a last resort when external
tax revenues could not meet exigent circumstances, or federal tax revenues
could be collected and dispersed by the states. Having learned from their
experience under the Articles of Confederation, however, the Federalists
refused to compromise on any of these issues, in the belief that anything
less than an unlimited power to tax would not give Congress the powers necessary
to restore its public credit. Since
the restoration of public credit was essential to Congress's ability to
borrow in order to fund possible future wars, the very survival of the United
States depended upon it.
Chapter Twelve explains that the Antifederalists also objected
to the mode (as distinguished from subject) of taxation in the proposed
Constitution. They prophesized
that the primacy of federal taxation would leave state citizens unable to
pay state taxes. As federal
administration grew, the states would whither, until even their own citizens
would demand the abolition of the states as useless tax burdens. Once the states were removed as obstacles,
the national government would tax everything. Chapter Thirteen details the Federalist
response. They asserted that
taxes on imports would be unnoticed by most citizens and would cover most
of the costs of peacetime government.
Even these taxes would be on luxuries only, not on necessities. In the unlikely event that internal taxes
were needed, state officers could collect them according to state regulations.
Also, as the national government took on the most costly functions
of government, states could tax less, and the net tax burden on citizens
would decrease. Finally, any oppression from import taxes
would be self-correcting, as consumers would avoid any product overpriced
due to excessive import taxation.
Chapter Fourteen outlines the Federalist's post-ratification fiscal
policies. As was the case with
promises regarding the military, Edling concludes "the Federalists fulfilled
their promise not only to finance the federal government by means of customs
duties but also to introduce a fiscal regime that would allow for a sharp
reduction of direct state taxes" (p.212).
In fact, "duties on imports formed the greatest share of federal
revenue up until the entry of the United States in World War I" (p 214). Although the Federalists did introduce
direct, internal taxes on slaves, houses, and land, "the more reasonable
interpretation" is that this was a "response to crisis," and not "in order
to establish 'big government'" (p.215).
In a brief concluding chapter, Edling summarizes that the Federalists
succeeded in creating "small, light, and inconspicuous" government (p.227)
and "if the purpose of the Constitution was to create a powerful national
government, then the development of the American republic may be read as
one of the great ironies of history" (p.228).
This is a remarkable book. Readers of it will never view the U.S. Constitution or the
founding period in the same way again.
It confronts the reader with a remarkably new and different perspective
that the primary goal of the framers of the Constitution and its Federalist
defenders was to create a strong fiscal-military state that could raise
the revenue needed to survive military competition against other nations. The book is clearly written, well-organized,
and serves the intended audience well. Garnering documentary support from a wide
variety of Federalist and Anti-federalist thinkers, Edling thoroughly documents
and supports every step in his argument. Indeed, footnoted references alone comprise 73 pages. Hopefully, his thesis will-as it should-generate
much intense discussion and debate in the future.
My one serious problem with the book regards Edling's conclusions.
The author argues that history proved the Federalists almost completely
correct in their prophecies, and the Anti-federalists almost completely
mistaken in theirs. However, his conclusions are supported
by historical analysis almost exclusively of the immediate post-ratification
period, supplemented by some occasional cursory historical analysis of developments
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. He makes no mention whatsoever of developments
in the modern era-i.e., the latter half of the 20th century. There is a very strong (perhaps even indisputable)
argument to be made that recent, modern history has actually proven the
Antifederalists correct on many counts. By no stretch of the imagination is the U.S national government
today "small, light, and inconspicuous." Quite the contrary, it is constantly criticized for exemplifying
powerful, centralized, "big government." Federal laws increasingly regulate
nearly all aspects of the lives of U.S. citizens. Almost every type of income and market
good or service is taxed today, at relatively high and often-increasing
rates. The U.S. faces dangerously
high and record budget deficits and total debt. Moreover, although the U.S. military has only a limited (yet
increasing) involvement in domestic law enforcement, federal law enforcement
in general has grown considerably in recent decades and increasingly pervades
the lives of ordinary citizens. The
U.S. military has become so large and powerful relative to the rest of the
world that the U.S. is no longer merely a "superpower" but is now a "hyperpower."
Many (though admittedly not all) of the Federalists' predictions
about limited government have eventually been proven quite wrong. Yet it
is not until the very last sentence of his text that Edling admits to a
possible discrepancy between Federalist prophecies and modern reality:
"a constitution that is universally regarded as the paragon of limited
government allowed for the creation of what today remains the world's only
superpower" (p.229). Indeed,
any reader of this book should be left nervously pondering which other Antifederalist
fears will also eventually come to fruition.
The strengths of this book, however, far outweigh any of its shortcomings. This book is a must-read for anyone seeking a better understanding of the founding period, the U.S. Constitution, or even current U.S. military and fiscal policies. Teachers of undergraduate or graduate courses involving constitutional law, defense policy, budgetary policy, or American political thought should seriously consider adopting this book as a course reading.
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Copyright 2004 by the author, Rick A. Swanson