Vol. 14 No. 3 (March 2004)
BRIAN DICKSON: A JUDGE'S JOURNEY. By Robert J. Sharpe
and Kent Roach. Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society
for Canadian Legal History, 2003. 624pp. Cloth $50.00 £40.00 ISBN 0-8020-8952-6.
Reviewed By Thomas M.J. Bateman, Department of Political
Science, St. Thomas University. bateman@stu.ca
This biography is the latest in a series of studies of
Canadian law and jurists published under the auspices of The Osgoode Society
for Canadian Legal History. In keeping with other works in the series, it
is thorough, detailed, well-written, and informative both for the intelligent
general reader and academic specialist. The book is written very much in
the spirit of JUDGING BERTHA WILSON (2001), a biography of one of Dickson's
colleagues and kindred spirits on the Supreme Court in the 1980s, and another
in the Osgoode Society series.
According to the authors, one a recognized and prolific
professor of law and the other a legal academic appointed to the bench,
Dickson's penultimate position as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Canada placed him "at the centre of the transformation of Canadian law and
political life" (p.3). This begs the question: Did Dickson produce the transformation
or was he swept up in its currents? The book, as this passage may suggest,
does not offer a clear answer.
Brian Dickson was a prairie kid, born in Yorkton, Saskatchewan
in 1916. His father was a junior bank manager, which meant that the family
moved a fair bit, ending up in Winnipeg in the 1930s. It also meant that
the family's income was modest but comfortable. Dickson enrolled in law
school in Winnipeg and got a practitioner's education. Times were difficult
upon graduation, and he was forced to sell insurance for a time before joining
the war effort. In battle near Falaise, near the Normandy coast, on a "beautiful
summer day" in August 1944, Dickson became the victim of friendly fire in
a poorly-coordinated operation combining air and ground forces and lost
his right leg.
Substantially recovered from his injuries and now with
a young family, Dickson took up a legal career and became a successful and
wealthy commercial lawyer in Winnipeg, throwing himself into all sorts of
community service at the same time. Commercial law is an unlikely preparation
for the bench, since the competence of commercial lawyers is measured in
part by their ability to stay out of court-and Dickson was a good commercial
lawyer. Nonetheless, his professionalism, reputation, and record of community
service did not go unnoticed, and in 1963 he took a position on the Manitoba
Court of Queen's Bench, much to the surprise of the Manitoba legal community.
The bench suited him, and he ascended to the Manitoba Court
of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1973. He became Chief
Justice in April, 1984.
Dickson's ascent to the top of the Supreme Court of Canada
coincided with the Court's foray into the age of the Charter of Rights.
A great deal of the Charter bears his imprint. He wrote the decision in
1986 that framed the Court's interpretive approach to section 1 of the Charter,
the provision which declares that Charter rights are subject to such reasonable
limitations as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
He wrote one of the opinions in the second MORGENTALER (1988) abortion rights
case that attempted a limited, procedurally-oriented invalidation of Canada's
abortion law, allowing Parliament room to fashion another law more consistent
with the priorities of women seeking abortions. The authors' review of Dickson's
private papers reveals that he authored the Court's unanimous, unsigned
judgment of the Court that struck down Quebec's unilingual commercial sign
law. But the same decision essentially declared as a constitutional principle
that Quebec is a distinct society possessing the constitutional room to
preserve and promote its particular linguistic character in the Canadian
federation.
These were among the most explosive decisions of the Charter
era. Dickson's objective was to seek consensus on the Court, to redraft
his own opinions to attract the concurrence of colleagues. Occasionally,
his papers reveal, his post-hearing ruminations produced an about-face.
At all times he tried to write clearly so the intelligent layperson, the
trial judge, and the juror could all apply constitutional law consistently,
and he was consistently praised for his legal writing.
As Chief Justice Dickson was an administrator of the Court's
business. He immediately took command of a court weighed down with a backlog
of cases due to the presence on the Court of a few very slow writers, whose
delays annoyed colleagues who expected timely responses to their drafts.
Illness produced more delays, and certain justices, like Willard Estey,
did not resist government invitations to sit on royal commissions, drawing
their attention away from their primary responsibilities. A larger problem
was that complex Charter issues were before the Court, and settled case
law was of little help in disposing of them. The Court, after all, felt
irresistible pressure to shake itself from the conservatism and deference
of its record on the 1960 Bill of Rights. Dickson himself wrote or concurred
in many of the decisions of the pre-Charter era that Charter drafters and
legal academics reviled. So Dickson and his colleagues had to think creatively
about Charter issues, departing from the legal past while anticipating a
cloudy legal future in which the Charter was sure to play a significant
part. Not surprisingly, there were hints of reliance upon American solutions
to constitutional problems, but the Justices also looked to European experience
as well. A definably Canadian rights jurisprudence slowly formed out of
the mix.
Among his attributes as Chief, Dickson had a real ability
to cajole his colleagues toward consensus and to lead by example. He instituted
some American-style procedural efficiencies, such as more expeditious leave
application procedures and time limits on oral arguments. Dickson presided
over the expansion of intervenors' status in constitutional cases, a reform,
he thought, would stray the Court from the formal model of litigation. More
to his liking were reforms opening proceedings to the media, allowing entrée
to the Court for the odd documentary and providing pre-release access to
judgments to improve accurate reporting.
Probably the most prominent theme in the book is how Dickson
facilitated Canadian law's movement from an older, formalist model in which
law was confined to formulaic adjudication of disputes between individuals,
to the new era in which law is viewed as a tool for general social reform.
His early decisions reveal a tendency to apply the letter of law positivistically,
regardless of the fairness to the parties and in reverence to the common
law tradition-follow precedent, decide disputes, dispense equitable justice
within the confines of the fundamental principle of the rule of law, defer
to the legislative branch.
But Sharpe and Roach are at pains to suggest throughout
that Dickson had "progressive views" (p.77) all his life and needed only
the correct legal influences to engage them in his decision making. Dickson
was the product of a practitioner's legal education in Manitoba and spent
his earlier career in isolation from the growing academic ferment in legal
education. But his service on the bench introduced him to a second legal
education, this time oriented to the academic study of law, a pedagogy that
situates law in social and political context. Adjudication and judicial
review necessarily possess a policy-making dimension, according to the new
pedagogy, and law students are encouraged to pursue these connections. The
new paradigm represents a functional approach.
Dickson's second legal education took place while he was
on the bench, through the reading of academic analyses of law in submissions
to the court and in his own research. His clerks, all of them recent products
of contemporary legal education, were of tremendous assistance in this respect. But Dickson remained the bridge between
the two worlds. He combined the contextualism of the new approach to law
with the reverence for the rule of law - the need for simple, stable rules
to guide all and sundry. His military formalism combined with his sensitivity
to context in matters ranging from the definition of the "reasonable person"
to the reception of new types of evidence in criminal cases to vitiate criminal
responsibility. Of the latter, the use of the battered woman's syndrome
in R. v. LAVALLEE (1990) is among the most instructive.
So Dickson's "journey", as the book's title indicates,
is from an older, staid world of lawyers' law to the new world of academic,
functional law in the service of social justice. But, since he was on the
journey - neither at his point of departure nor at his destination - tensions
abounded. What the authors call a "complex weave" of ideas reconciling individualist
and communitarian views of law and the constitution can also be considered
unresolved intellectual conflict. Generally, the progressive older Dickson
stands in stark contrast to the narrower, more positivist, rule-bound, formalistic
early Dickson. But the reader senses that Dickson's overarching concern
for the reputation of the Court in the Charter era led him to suppress older
instincts and adapt to the interpretive innovation of his younger colleagues
and the wider legal community.
The tug of the legal academy on Dickson and the Court suggests
a powerful institutional influence on decisional output. While the Court
and its processes significantly changed under Dickson's leadership, the
ancillary institutional structure - clerks, intervenors, academic legal
scholarship - exerted significant influence on Dickson and the Court.
In keeping with the judiciary's notable political role
in the Canadian polity, Dickson paid close attention to others' perceptions
of the Court. He was an assiduous reader of newspapers and regularly circulated
stories to his colleagues. Early on, before Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell
(1997) popularized the idea, he averred that courts and legislatures properly
engage in a "policy dialogue," suggesting that the Charter submits legislative
products to "moral critique" (p.381).
This book has several merits. It is written in a lively
narrative and spares the reader long, block quotes legal writers usually
find too tempting to resist. It contains some truly dramatic stories of
personality clashes. Unforgettable is a 1991 speech by former Prime Minister
Pierre Elliott Trudeau at the opening of the Bora Laskin Library at the
University of Toronto. Dickson sat in the front row while Trudeau, apparently
without prior knowledge of Dickson's attendance, savaged the 1981 Supreme
Court of Canada opinion on patriation of the constitution in REFERENCE RE
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (also called the PATRIATION REFERENCE).
Dickson concurred with the majority opinion which forced Trudeau to negotiate
with the provinces before having the British Parliament entrench the Charter
and turn the constitution over to Canada. Dickson could only sit in his
chair and seethe (pp.277-81). Another tension-filled event occurred when
retiring Justice Willard Estey issued an unseemly outburst against his colleagues
and the Court upon leaving the bench (pp.427-30).
Sharpe and Roach omit, however, a discussion of the tangled
web the Court spun on equality rights. Dickson participated in the signal
human rights case of the era, ANDREWS v. LAW SOCIETY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
(1989), an appeal from a decision of a lower court which found that a requirement
that lawyers be Canadian citizens violated section 15 of the Charter, but
the authors do not mention it. Instead
they cite earlier decisions on employment discrimination that reversed pre-Charter
decisions applying formalistic definitions of equality to the dissatisfaction
of women's groups and cultural minorities. ANDREWS was the first of a series
of cases that made s. 15 well-nigh unintelligible, prompting the Court to
revisit its interpretive foundations with the intent of clarification.
Also, while the authors indicate that Dickson was highly
receptive to legal perspectives represented by his female colleagues - he was apparently talked
out of his anger at Chantelle Daigle's calculated contempt for the Court
and the rule of law in DAIGLE v. TREMBLAY (1989) by the recently-appointed
Beverly McLachlin (pp.389-95) - they note that Bertha Wilson and Claire
L'Heureux-Dubé were "coolly received" (p.300) by Dickson and others upon
their appointments. Surely this is a matter worth some attention, especially
since Supreme Court justices were informally consulted prior to the filling
of vacancies on the bench. What, precisely, did Dickson have against these
two appointees?
And, is it true that many of Dickson's decisions on the
bench are related to his personal experiences? Did he grant high tort awards
for pain and suffering because of his own war injury? Were his inclinations
toward equal division of marital property at divorce a product of his estimation
of his own wife's contribution to his career? Were his pro-environmental
decisions a product of his own love of the outdoors? Were his decisions
limiting police discretion a consequence of his childhood experience of
watching a police officer shoot a cat? These associations make for good
narrative, but do they have any other value?
Biographies like this are a welcome development in Canada.
One hopes they prompt Canadians to inquire further into the operations of
their courts and the people who command them. The authors may not have intended
this, but the public education achieved by such books will almost certainly
lead to calls for more open and accountable mechanisms for high court appointments.
Indeed, Canada's new Prime Minister, Paul Martin, has promised precisely
this and will be held to his word this year when his government will be
required to appoint a new justice to the Supreme Court to fill the vacancy
to be left by Madame Justice Louise Arbour's June, 2004 departure. Most
Canadian legal academics oppose parliamentary hearings; they think public
hearings are "political" or otherwise unseemly. What role the legal academy
will have in such new institutional conditions will be an interesting development
to watch.
REFERENCES:
Anderson, Ellen.
2001. JUDGING
BERTHA WILSON: LAW AS LARGE AS LIFE. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press.
Hogg, Peter,
and Bushell, Allison. 1997. "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures:
Or Perhaps the Charter Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All." 35 OSGOODE HALL
LAW JOURNAL 75-124.
CASE REFERENCES:
ANDREWS v. LAW
SOCIETY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1 S.C.R. 143 (1989).
REFERENCE RE
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA, 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (1981).
R. v. LAVALLEE,
1 S.C.R. 852 (1990).
R. v. MORGENTALER,
1 S.C.R. 30 (1988).
TREMBLAY v. DAIGLE, 2 S.C.R. 530 (1989).
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Copyright 2004 by the author, Thomas M.J. Bateman.