Vol. 11 (September 2001) pp. 426-429.

CULTURAL PLURALISM AND DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE by Monique Deveaux. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. 205pp. $35.00. ISBN: 0-8014-3582-6.

Reviewed by: Alice Hearst, Smith College.

Over the last two decades, political theorists have struggled to make sense of the claims of cultural minorities to recognition, accommodation and respect. Hemmed in by a theoretical framework designed to enhance the autonomy of the individual, liberal and democratic theorists have found it difficult to articulate a theory of group rights compatible with the fundamental imperatives of a liberal, democratic state. In CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE, Monique Deveaux examines how efforts to reformulate both liberal and democratic theory to account for the value of cultural pluralism have fallen short. Deveaux argues that justice for cultural minority groups means taking seriously group based demands for respect and recognition; it also means according such groups a MEANINGFUL
place in public discussion. In this latter claim lies the rub. Deveaux argues that creating a seat at the table for such groups may require significant modifications in how dominant cultures listen to members of minority groups.

Most liberal and democratic theories, she points out, require that participants alienate themselves from their most important beliefs and constitutive cultural attachments when they enter the public arena. The requirement that individuals come to public dialogue disconnected from their most important attachments results in a strangely sterile interchange, with particularly devastating impacts on minority cultural groups. For these groups, the imperative to participate in public dialogue as an unencumbered individual strips them of their most powerful arguments for accommodation or rights, with the result that their claims are often dismissed as unreasonable or indefensible. Minority cultural groups, qua groups, she argues, have, at the very least, the "right to challenge and to help shape the public and
political cultures of the societies in which they live" (p.181).

Even that relatively modest demand, however, becomes impossible when the terms of interaction are set by the dominant culture and those terms are at odds with the norms and beliefs of the minority culture. Deveaux argues that liberal democratic states cannot justly determine what demands should be recognized nor what forms of accommodation are appropriate unless and until they seriously engage a dialogue with members of a minority cultural group. That serious engagement can only occur when minority cultural groups have had full opportunities to explain their position ON TERMS THEY HAVE HAD A HAND IN CHOOSING, so "more direct knowledge of the content of a culture (and if possible, engagement with particular groups) is necessary if we are to avoid treating collective social differences as mere difficulties to be overcome, as problems to be mediated" (p. 58).

Deveaux proposes, in the end, infusing liberal theory with a thicker concept

Page 427 begins here

of democracy, invoking a deliberative discourse model that is less dependent on the requirement of strong consensus and attentive to the realities of social and political economy than traditionally espoused, an approach that she labels "deliberative liberalism." Doing so, she argues, requires some fundamental shifts in the liberal conceptual framework. If liberal democracies want to fully "recognize [.] the importance of citizens' cultural identities and memberships to political life and acknowledge [.] the need for some special arrangements and rights for such citizens" (p. 182), they must first learn to value diversity in collective social identities at
least as much as they value individual differences and preferences. That shift will in turn engender more respect for the assertion of group rights, which is an essential aspect of recognizing and protecting cultural pluralism, and shift the focus away from the overweening emphasis on individual rights and freedoms. Finally, these changes require that liberal democracies be less insistent upon a sharp distinction between the public and private identities of their citizens (pp. 30-31).

Deveaux devotes the bulk of her book to an extended critique of extant models of liberalism and deliberative democracy insofar as scholars reworked those models to respond to the demand for rights and respect by minority cultural groups. Liberal toleration models, discussed in Chapter Two, for example, while appearing to provide broad protection for diversity in a society's cultural life, are some of the least satisfactory. Toleration based approaches rely primarily upon negative rights that, while perhaps limiting direct encroachments on diverse cultural practices, do nothing to promote different cultural identities. In fact, it is within a tolerance
model that most nation-states have been most effectively able to exert pressure to assimilate minority cultural groups. Moreover, contemporary theorists of tolerance require citizens to bracket their identities in significant ways, demarcating public from private beliefs. This requirement of public reason means, "ethnic and religious minority groups whose political views are intertwined with their moral and religious beliefs may well be excluded" (pp. 30-31). Finally, a model of liberalism based upon tolerance alone does not preclude dominant groups from privileging their own viewpoints. Models of tolerance simply do not require the kind of sustained
and serious engagement among different cultural groups that would lead to increased understanding, dialogue and respect, nor does it allow members of a
political community to make informed decisions about what levels of diversity can and should be tolerated or promoted.

Theories of liberal neutrality, addressed in Chapter Three, are likewise limited. While improving upon merely tolerant models by committing the state to fairness and impartiality among cultural groups, such models often presume that different cultural groups within a society have equal access to dialogue and interchange. And a model of neutrality operates from the premise that competing groups and individuals are motivated to secure neutral justice, which may or may not be true (p. 67). Although a model of neutral public reason may require less bracketing of cultural beliefs, some cultural groups will find it difficult to persuade others of the value of
their beliefs--and thus to secure understanding or accommodation--because the reasons they can articulate may be limited by that same set of beliefs. Nor will all groups agree that justice consists in fairness alone; since "citizens with highly determinate religious and cultural identities

Page 428 begins here

are much less likely than are others to perceive their views as cohering with norms of neutrality," the exclusionary tendencies of neutrality-oriented liberalism are accentuated (pp. 97-98).

Liberal perfectionism models, discussed in Chapter 4, depart from traditional liberal models in that they explicitly recognize the importance of constitutive attachments, but fall short of securing justice for cultural groups because they value diversity only in an instrumental sense: individuals' constitutive attachments are valuable only insofar as secure attachment to a community advances individual autonomy. These models therefore value only those cultural attachments that are largely liberal, according to Deveaux. Illiberal groups will find themselves closed out of serious public dialogue from the outset. It is difficult to formulate a
convincing argument for supporting cultural practices that limit individual capacities, but Deveaux takes a bold step here. She argues that, "cultural communities may . need to restrict their members' horizons and choices. [M]embership in traditional cultural communities that are merely nonliberal [rather than coercive] in their belief systems ... may well be valuable for reasons overlooked by [liberal perfectionists]. Consider, for example, the sense of emotional security and well-being that can come from being a member of a collectivity with clearly defined norms and roles. Restrictions on social arrangements and one's choice of marriage partner and career may well be a valuable BENEFIT of cultural membership" (pp. 121-22). Liberal states must be attentive to illiberality, but should not assume that a culture that
limits choices or doesn't foster independence is necessarily coercive (p. 126). With this point, Deveaux encourages hard thinking about questions liberals tend to dismiss out of hand, and creates an arena within which these kinds of values may be seriously discussed and debated.

Chapter 5 addresses the adequacy of models of deliberative democracy in accommodating deep cultural pluralism, and is optimistic about the potential of such deep democracy for protecting minority cultural groups. Deveaux notes, however, that while such models generally promise increased participation by individual citizens, they do not necessarily lead to better representation of cultural groups. The ideal of strong consensus embedded in these models, however, is problematic. These models presume that differences among individuals and groups can always be resolved by good, publicly accessible arguments. Deveaux argues that deep cultural pluralism needs face up to the fact that some viewpoints may be flatly incompatible--and allow that incompatibility to exist. Prevailing models of deliberative democracy rely upon predeliberative norms about what issues may reasonably be discussed and under what conditions that discussion may take place in ways that
disadvantage minority cultures. Finally, these models often presume that distinct groups will have sufficient power to command respectful consideration of their views, and is thus inattentive to the economic and political disadvantages experienced by most cultural minorities. Those groups are not likely to have participated in setting the terms of discourse, and may not therefore find that discursive form legitimate.

Deveaux then moves to her own model, deliberative liberalism. She argues that liberal democratic societies need to do much more to secure citizens' actual agreement on procedures for public debate, decisionmaking and disagreement and must do so by allowing individuals to enter

Page 429 begins here

the public arena as whole persons, with their identities firmly in hand. Only by allowing individuals to fully explain their beliefs and justifications--to argue from their own particular viewpoints--can a deeply diverse society flourish. To allow such a multiplicity of voices to engage in dialogue means that liberal democratic societies cannot insist upon a norm of strong consensus. Moreover, these societies need to rethink what counts as adequate public reasoning, and be attentive to the relative power positions of all parties to the discussion. The legitimacy of the deliberative process can be evaluated by determining whether there are groups whose viewpoints routinely lose in the public arena. If those groups also face serious social, cultural and economic disadvantages, steps must be taken to correct those power imbalances. Furthermore, liberal democracies should reconsider their requirements of public reason to open the dialogue to greater participation.

CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE is a pithy little book, and Deveaux's analysis of how existing models of liberalism and democracy fail to secure rich cultural pluralism is enlightening. Although she argues forcefully for the value of cultural diversity for its own sake, she is attentive to the fact that liberal democracies should not be required to support each and every culturally distinct group. However, she is adamant that decisions about what cultural practices should be promoted, protected or discouraged be made only after sincere efforts to understand the basis and consequences of such practices have been engaged. Deveaux wants to open a space within which people can discuss their most deeply cherished views and beliefs unhampered by rules that keep uncomfortable arguments waiting in the wings; she understands that trying to sustain sharp divisions between citizens' public and private lives will systematically disadvantage marginalized groups. Unfortunately, Deveaux spends relatively little time describing and operationalizing her own model, but the point is clear: states
can no longer be complacent about cultural pluralism, and liberal democracies need to turn their attention to rules of engagement that assure deep and
enduring diversity.

****************************************************************

Copyright 2001 by the author, Alice Hearst.