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common features of their respective theories nor the unique child-centered contributions they bring to the academic
and political discussion of education reform. He almost immediately shifts his attention to a pronouncement that,
"the state must ultimately decide what the interests of children, individually or collectively, are"
p. 65).
Given that the state actually decides what the interests of children are, it is na‹ve to assume children's interests
can be sufficiently separated from the state's interests in the way Dwyer's child-centered approach to education
reform requires. In a constitutive form of government, the "state" is the people. Public policy in representative
government is the result of rational discourse among interested adults and even uninterested adults who entrust
public officials to produce and implement fair and just policies. Thus, Dwyer's approach to education reform asks
the reader not only to separate children from adults but also to separate the state from the people-
a request that democratic readers will find offensive if not frightening. Furthermore, the fact that certain interests
held by children may overlap certain interests held by the state does not mean that philosophical considerations
of the interests held by children and simultaneously by the state necessarily and primarily serve the instrumental
ends of society as a whole rather than the interests of children. The reader would be well served by a more in-depth
elaboration of what child-centered curricula would entail and greater clarification of how a child-centered approach
to educational reform substantially differs from those offered in liberal education theory. As it stands, Dwyer's
child-centered perspective appears to separate children from all relevant adults-parents, teachers, administrators,
taxpayers, and
even society at-large-leaving only the state to define and protect children's interests. This perspective runs
directly counter to basic liberal principles of limited government and individual freedom.
In Chapter 3, Dwyer constructs an ideal voucher program in which all eligible schools "strive to advance the
educational interests of their students AS THE STATE SEES IT" (p. 67, emphasis in the original). A utilitarian
assessment of vouchers is then performed to determine whether his ideal program "would on the whole do more
good than harm, taking into account all the human interests at stake" (p. 68). The conclusion drawn from
his analysis is that children are the only persons with fundamental interests at stake in voucher programs. In
Chapter 4, he identifies interests that, from the state's perspective, are so important to individual well-being
that they ought to trump subordinate or non-fundamental interests. Here, Dwyer contends that the separate interests
in vouchers of all groups except for children are other-determining and therefore non-fundamental and of less moral
purchase than those of children. For example, he argues that the interests public school teachers and administrators
have in vouchers are those that are selfish, financially driven, and derived from a desire to retain their livelihood.
Any altruistic interests (such as a teacher's or parent's sincere interest in the eventual fate of children and
future generations) are summarily dismissed as non-fundamental.
The interest of children in vouchers is nonetheless dependent in Dwyer's analysis on a foundational assumption
that all children have a right to a good liberal, secular education. The leap Dwyer makes from the assumption
that all children have a right to a good education to the conclusion that the only children who have a moral
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right to vouchers are those in religious schools not now participating in voucher programs is an extraordinary
one indeed. He makes little attempt to demonstrate that children have a right to equal educational opportunities
except through very occasional reference to the proper goals of education (particularly those set forth by the
Court in BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION), in a passing statement that "many states recognize the moral right
of children to receive a good education in their own constitutions" (p. 102), and in a brief discussion concerning
the "priority of place" of children's interests and the proper goals of child rearing. Significantly,
Dwyer mentions the Court's decision in SAN ANTONIO IND. SCHOOL DIST. v. RODRIGUEZ (1973) only to point out that
the decision was based on an issue of federalism ("which is not relevant to the question here" p. 161),
and to cursorily mention that education has been deemed by the Court to not be a fundamental interest or right
that triggers strict scrutiny (p. 164). His examination of education reform completely ignores the Court's ruling
that children have no national constitutional right to an education. The omission is most likely intentional given
Dwyer's legal training at Yale Law School and his professional experience as an attorney specializing in family
law and youth law. His objective is clearly one of defending vouchers solely as a matter of right for children
in private schools. Chapters 5 and 6 more fully demonstrate this objective in his outline of specific legal strategies
through which to pursue Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause claims that lend greater support to the
constitutionality of vouchers. In these chapters, Dwyer suggests that the inconsistency and lack of clarity in
Supreme Court Establishment Clause doctrine opens the door for voucher advocates to sufficiently "secularize"
voucher programs in ways that might increase their chances of the Court upholding the constitutionality of vouchers.
His proposed Equal Protection strategy involves a redirection of attention away from the right of parents to school
choice toward the equal right of private school children to receive a "fair share of the state's expenditures
on education" (p. 167).
One need not endorse vouchers to find some value in the issues Dwyer raises even if his intended audience is one
that, ipso facto, accepts vouchers as a viable or "just" education reform measure. The book very explicitly
states many of the implicit assumptions held by school choice and voucher advocates. Dwyer's unapologetic support
of vouchers and articulation of the legal and philosophical foundations of voucher arguments, as well as his examination
of the moral and constitutional shortcomings of existing voucher proposals, paves the way for more direct and energetic
discussions of current school reform initiatives. His examination of how adults perceive the interests of children
challenges educators, scholars, and policy makers to reflect critically on the interests they hold in children's
education and the meaning they assign to adult representation of children's interests in education policy deliberations.
Finally, voucher opponents can consider Dwyer's book to be a guide to understanding the legal strategies voucher
proponents will likely pursue in the not-so-distant future.
CASE REFERENCES:
PIERCE v. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Copyright 2002 by the author, Terri B. Davis.