Vol. 3, No. 7 (July, 1993) pp. 71-73
IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE OF
EMERGENCY by Stephen Ellmann. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1992.
283 pp.
Reviewed by William A. Munro, Department of Political Science,
Northwestern University.
In systems of extreme authoritarian rule, can the law be used to
constrain the arbitrary exercise of state power, especially as it
impinges on the human rights of citizens? If so, how -- in
principle and in practice -- might it do so? These are the
questions that motivate Stephen Ellmann's absorbing and
provocative analysis of emergency law and human rights in South
Africa during the 1980s. He argues that, even in its darkest
times, the South African judiciary has not been entirely servile:
it has persistently rejected state attempts to place emergency
legislation beyond the court's purview, although it has allowed
the state to curtail that purview. Consequently, Ellmann
suggests, an understanding of the doctrinal and interpretational
choices made by the court might suggest answers to the book's
central questions. Drawing on South African case material, he
concludes that a judiciary founded upon a robust legal culture
which values judicial independence, an interest in human rights
and professional ethics provides a solid foundation for
successfully challenging the egregious use of state power.
This is a wide-ranging and provocative piece of legal scholarship
which draws on a broad range of comparative legal history and is
rich in speculations about the relationship between law and
state. The argument of the book is constructed around a close and
critical procedural reading of Appellate Division decisions on
emergency law cases in the years 1985 to 1990, firstly under
Chief Justice Pieter Rabie and subsequently under Chief Justice
Michael Corbett. The narrow focus on emergency law provides a
significant orientation for the author: states of emergency
represent `the worst of times', when state intrusions in the
lives of citizens are greatest. Moreover, from the point of view
of legal interpretation and human rights, states of emergency
generate paradoxical ethical questions. On the one hand emergency
laws are promulgated when it appears that ordinary law is
inadequate to protect the social order. Under such conditions
judges may believe that the interests of state security should
override the interests of individual rights (broadly, and
somewhat vaguely, construed by the author as `human' rights). On
the other hand, governments frequently declare states of
emergency as a political contingency against the rapidly
dissipating legitimacy of the regime. In such cases lawyers and
judges face difficult ethical questions about how to oppose a
legal system designed to sustain an unjust social order. These
complex ethical questions, profoundly present during South
Africa's emergency, provide the author a framework within which
to analyse the capacity (and willingness) of the judiciary to
constrain state power.
He proceeds by showing first that despite a constitutional
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, a positivist legal
tradition, and a massive legal edifice of apartheid laws, South
African rules of statutory interpretation offer strong doctrinal
grounds to sustain human rights. Under the leadership of Chief
Justice Rabie, however, the court chose overwhelmingly to support
state security interests and to reject human rights concerns.
Through a close reading of the cases, Ellman shows that it
frequently did so on weak doctrinal grounds and through abrupt
dismissal of contrary argumentation. Moreover, all emergency law
cases were heard by an `emergency team' of five like-minded
judges, including the Chief Justice. Thus it seems clear that the
court acted `politically'. Nevertheless, Ellman argues, the court
tenaciously sustained its right to keep state actions within its
purview; thus it was not simply a political tool. Under Rabie's
successor, Chief Justice Corbett, on the other hand, the court
reversed this trend; without departing radically from the
jurisprudence of the Rabie court, it has shown a pronounced
readiness to support human interests against state interests.
For Ellmann, these trends in interpretation show that the court
has been able to exercise choices and has always insisted on a
modicum of judicial independence and respect for the law. The
explanation for this insistence, he argues, lies in a legal
culture characterised by `visions of the rule of law' (164) which
stress both judicial independence (traceable in the Rabie court)
and respect for citizens' rights (traceable in the Corbett
court). On his account, these traditions -- which have complex
sources -- are the saving grace of the South African judiciary;
they have kept intact the moral stature of the law and its
institutions as South Africa enters a period of profound
political transformation. Because they are sustained both by
judges and by lawyers, judges have been right not to resign in
the face of unjust laws, and lawyers have been right to adopt
incrementalist strategies of lawyering rather than Gandhian or
confrontational strategies.
The argument is meticulously constructed and reasoned.
Nevertheless, it spans a wide political, legal and cultural
compass, and its central focus on emergency litigation at the
appellate level bears a cost. In the procedural analysis of the
court, the author's analytical vision is sharp, clear and
focused; when he turns to politics and causation, it is broader
and more speculative. For instance, Ellmann never directly
addresses the political character of the Rabie court's `emergency
team'. He argues that the court construed in favour of state
security for three main reasons: the judges really did believe
that there was an emergency; they had faith in senior officials;
and they had sympathy for the difficulties that public officials
faced in implementing emergency laws under volatile political
conditions. But all these reasons reflect a certain wilfulness on
the part of the judges. Ab initio judges ought to be suspicious
of emergencies precisely because they do assail the rule of law.
In the face of massive evidence of state cynicism, including the
`endemic official lawlessness' of the 1980s (24-25), the Rabie
court displayed no such suspicion. Thus one must be wary of
over-simplifying the court's attachment to `the familiar customs
of the law' (99) and consider more closely the dynamic
relationship between the law and politics.
To do so has ramifications for the larger argument of the book.
In the first place, if Rabie was a political appointee, the
capacity of the court to cleave to these customs was politically
imperiled. (Unfortunately, Ellmann's discussion of Rabie's own
politics is disappointingly thin, and he never considers whether
the legal establishment was able to guide or constrain government
appointments.) There may, moreover, be an imbalance in the
political significance of those cases in which the court
supported state security and those in which it constrained state
power. For instance, the case in which the court allowed the
state to curtail its purview of state actions most dramatically,
UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT, coincided with an intensive state effort
to comprehensively silence the United Democratic Front, its
principal oppositional organisation. One is left wondering
whether the Rabie court's decision (described by Ellmann as the
`nadir[] of the Rabie era's work (98)) was a part of that
campaign; if so the effective political reach of legal culture is
called into question, and the role of law in political
legitimation is highlighted.
Ellmann presents a sweeping and provocative discussion of the
importance of law in South African culture, but is reluctant to
directly address questions of political causation. He explains
the government's replacement of Rabie with Corbett in very
general terms as an outcome of the political struggle or
government reformism. But if the Corbett appointment represented
an attempt to re-legitimise the law itself, then political change
rather than legal culture provides a more powerful causal account
of the court's tendency to constrain egregious use of state
power. At such times lawyers face particularly acute strategic
questions about how to sustain a legal culture that supports
human rights, especially since a determination to cleave to the
conventions of the law and its institutions may under certain
conditions come to contradict a demand for good law. Thus it is
important to stress more than Ellmann does the distinction
between respect for law and respect for good law, and to take
very seriously indeed the possibility that they may become
incompatible in lawyers' practice.
Indeed, this distinction has broader significance for South
Africa's legal culture in the future. Much South African law --
ordinary and emergency -- was `bad law', and the administration
of bad law is not the same as the administration of justice (a
point which Ellmann recognises but does not address directly).
There is very little discussion in the book of ordinary law. Yet
ordinary law was a major vehicle for the implementation of
apartheid. Indeed, it is not a settled matter that emergency laws
were significantly more intrusive in the lives of most South
Africans than ordinary apartheid law. The book's focus on the
elite strata of judges and lawyers glosses over the fact that
most South Africans encountered the law on an everyday basis in
the form of administrative law under the jurisdiction of
magistrates. Magistrates, as Ellmann notes in a footnote, were
civil servants whose prospects for promotion depended on them
pleasing their superiors. If this means that `legal culture' did
not extend `down' to magistrates, Ellmann's claims for the
strength and resilience of this culture are less secure.
Ultimately, Ellmann's cultural analysis offers a rather
optimistic vision of the political effectiveness of South
Africa's legal culture. Thus he argues that whereas a range of
regimes have "profoundly undercut the potential value of the
courts as protectors of the people", South Africa "has
not travelled very far" down such paths (171). This is an
implausible reading of South Africa's legal past, and an
optimistic reading for its future. South Africa has travelled
very far down this road indeed, not least in the construction and
implementation of `ordinary law'. Ellmann is precisely right to
stress that the construction of a strong and independent
judiciary for a post-apartheid South Africa must begin today, and
that the legal culture which he describes provides a solid
foundation. But it is critical to point out this legal culture
must be sustained at the lowest levels of the law as well as the
highest. The alternative grassroots judicial institutions (such
as `peoples' courts') that sprang up in South Africa during the
1980s signal the difficulty of securing such a culture at the
popular level.
The prospects of human rights in South Africa are uncertain.
Stephen Ellmann's book invites debate on this critical concern,
and I offer my remarks in this spirit. The strength of Stephen
Ellmann's book is to show that the South African judiciary has a
solid doctrinal, institutional and cultural basis for securing
human rights. For South African legal specialists it is thus
particularly welcome at a time when they must unflinchingly
consider their future in the full light of their past. But this
engaging book also offers broader insights on the politics of
doctrinal innovation, state legitimation, and the institutional
power of judiciaries in authoritarian regimes. Thus it should
also stir spirited argument within a wider audience of
comparative legal scholars. .
Copyright 1993