Vol. 2 No. 2 (February, 1992) pp. 35-37
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS by James W. Ely, Jr. New York: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 1992. 193 pp. Cloth $32.50. Paper $10.95.
Reviewed by David Schultz, Department of Political Science,
Trinity University.
Ely's book is part of Oxford University's bicentennial essays on
the Bill of Rights and it offers opportune reconsidera- tion of
the constitutional status of property rights in America at a time
when property rights are yet again receiving serious
reconsideration by the Supreme Court.
This book offers a good short history of "economic and
property rights from the settlement of America to the
present" (p. 9). The author argues three propositions that
provide the analytical framework for the book. First, that the
Founders envisioned some type of judicial protection of property
rights. Second, that the relegation of property rights to a
secondary status is not warranted and that the Framers did not
intend to distinguish property and personal rights in the way the
Post CAROLENE Products (1938) Court apparently does. Third, that
the Framers understood that property rights were not absolute and
that they would need to be limited in some way.
Additionally, two other conclusions emerge out of Ely's book.
First, that while the Constitution and the judiciary do value
property rights, the exact type of property favored at a
particular time in history is influenced by a variety of politi-
cal-economic factors. Second, that the Court may yet again place
more emphasis upon property rights, but not to the degree that it
did prior to the New Deal.
In using the first three points to frame the book, Ely first
provides a brief introduction to the influence of British proper-
ty rights discourse upon colonial America. Ely notes the impor-
tance of Locke and Blackstone upon the Founders and indicates how
they saw property as an important political concept associated
with individual liberty. Particularly interesting in this opening
discussion is the claim that the Framers originally felt that
property could be protected through the normal operations of the
political process, but that the introduction of the Fifth
Amendment and assumption of judicial review of economic claims
meant that property was promoted to a substantive value that
deserved special institutional protection beyond the normal
political means.
Thus, after setting the intellectual background, the author does
a solid job in discussing how the contract, the 14th Amend- ment
due process, and the Fifth Amendment eminent domain Clauses
("...nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation") were subsequently appealed to at
various
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times in American history to protect property rights. Ely reviews
the Marshall Court's expansive use of the Contract Clause to
protect property interests and also discusses Justice Field's
dissent in the SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES to show how it became the
precedent for subsequent liberty of contract and substantive due
process adjudication.
The book also offers a good discussion of the growing importance
of the Fifth Amendment eminent domain clause. Ely is correct to
note that it has become the last major constitutional provision
used to protect property, and he also addresses briefly how
conservatives such as Richard Epstein and Stephen Macedo have
sought to reinvigorate property rights claims in it and in the
process limit the regulatory functions of the state.
Finally, the book provides an overview of the constitutional
status of property rights since 1938. In this discussion Ely
reminds the reader that despite the secondary status given to
property, the Court, most notably in Justice Stewart's 1973
opinion in LYNCH V. HOUSEHOLD FINANCE, has be uncomfortable in
completely distinguishing property from personal rights and that
there is a connection between the two.
There is clearly much to commend in this book, especially in its
attempt to provide a short review of an important subject.
However, this book is not intended to be an exhaustive or highly
original discussion of property rights and the Constitution. This
book, as with the other books in this Cambridge Series, are meant
to be introductory monographs on a particular Bill of Rights
subject. This book is more suited to undergraduates, general
audiences, and those lacking a background in this area. However,
serious property rights scholars will find the book helpful, but
not original.
Given the limited scope of the book, many criticisms about what
the book has omitted are ill-placed; however, there are a few
criticisms worth noting.
First, while Ely generally provides a good discussion of the
intellectual background on American views on property, he glosses
over the differences between Locke and Blackstone. While Black-
stone certainly was influenced by the former, Blackstone's
approach to property provided the judiciary with legal arguments
to buttress its property rights decisions. Noting how Blackstone
appreciated the legal limits on property could explain why or how
property was open to more control than otherwise thought. Noting
their differences would also support Ely's claim that the Found-
ers did not envision property claims as absolute because Black-
stone provides support for ways to limit property rights.
Second, absent from this discussion is James Harrington and the
republican tradition that associated property with power,
individual liberty, and popular government. The republican
tradition was an important
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influence on the Founders and this tradition could help to
explain much of the subsequent property rights discourse in
America and provide a stronger framing of how property in America
has come to be associated with liberty, power, and popular
government.
Another area where the book is lacking is in assessing the future
of Supreme Court property rights adjudication. While Ely does not
see the Court returning to a pre-New Deal property rights
jurisprudence, he underestimates the support property rights and
substantive due process has on the Court. Scalia, especially in
NOLLAN V. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, seemed prepared to
reinvigorate heightened scrutiny for some property regulation.
This 1987 case, along with FIRST ENGLISH EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN
CHURCH V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and the dissents in KEYSTONE
BITUMINOUS COAL ASSOCIATION V. DEBENEDICTIS in the same year are
all indications that a conservative Court is becoming more
supportive of property rights and is willing to invoke the Fifth
Amendment and the Contract Clause to limit property regula- tion.
Finally, while perhaps beyond the scope of the book, Ely could
have used his conclusion to better place property rights
adjudication within the larger content of judicial treatment of
property and personal rights. More attention could have been
devoted to noting increased judicial support of property rights
at a time when support for personal civil rights was decreasing.
Speculating on this matter could have raised more suggestive
questions about the property/personal rights dichotomy in the
Constitution, and it could have made a fine book even more
prophetic on the status of property rights in the 1990s.
Copyright 1992