Vol. 15 No.1 (January 2005), pp.18-21

COPING IN POLITICS WITH INDETERMINATE NORMS: A THEORY OF ENLIGHTENED LOCALISM, by Benjamin G. Gregg. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. 210pp. Cloth. $54.10. ISBN: 0-7914-5781-8.  Paper. $17.95. ISBN: 0-7914-5782-6

Reviewed by Tracy Lightcap, Department of Political Science, LaGrange College. E-mail: tlightcap@lagrange.edu

Uncertainty in social affairs has been a difficult topic for both social scientists and philosophers to address. In most cases, the issue has been strategically avoided. The usual course has been to treat decisions taken under conditions of risk as being uncertain. Hence, we see social scientists addressing uncertainty as a condition where probabilities can attach to outcomes, but only with an attendant risk of being mistaken. Actors can then make “decisions under uncertainty” by choosing rationally between the risks posed by different outcomes. By the same token, social philosophers can attach speculative normative value to different outcomes based on different determinate rules. This “uncertainty” can then be resolved on utilitarian grounds by the selection of particular rules. In both instances, there is an underlying assumption—that one set of decision outcomes or normative rules corresponds to a pre-existing order. If such an order exists, then general equilibrium states or determinate norms can be reached by a process of natural selection as outcomes are tested against “reality.”

Benjamin Gregg’s new book wrestles with another account of uncertainty. What if no such “natural” order exists? What if actors can – and do – change their environments readily through the very choices they make? And what if, to make matters more complex, they know that they do it? How, in such case, can we make useful statements about determinate norms in political decisions?

Gregg’s answer is simple: we cannot. Indeterminacy is endemic in human affairs, especially when normative decisions are at stake. When we make such decisions, we are constantly using terms that are by their nature open to interpretation. This would not be a particular difficulty if the interpretations themselves could be uniform. Gregg argues, however, that all interpretations of language, except for some particularly concrete actions, are conditioned by individual and community experience. Since these factors must vary, as do the conditions that produce them, there is little hope of generating uniformity. Instead, moral statements have a built-in ambiguity that defies all efforts to establish a priori standards.

Accepting this state of affairs leaves us in the quandary that inspired Gregg’s effort. If all moral statements are indeterminate, then there can be no standard to gage the worth of our assertions that works across our experiences. This means that all moral statements would be political in character; mere expressions of the power of decision-makers rather than expressions having any evaluative force. [*19] In turn this would suggest that efforts to engage others in a critique of their institutions and their justifications for them are a waste of time.

This dilemma is nothing new – it is at least 2400 years old – but Gregg proposes an interesting solution for it. Unlike many theorists, he begins by assuming that the indeterminacy of moral evaluations does not preclude making them sensible. There are two prongs to his argument.

First, Gregg embraces the idea of pragmatic truth. Here he is talking about the truth of propositions being based on their practical consequences. It is important to grasp his argument correctly here. Gregg is not arguing that truth is a matter of correspondence with reality, however defined. He thinks this option has been precluded by the indeterminate nature of claims about the external world. Rather, truth is a matter of how the practical consequences of actions cohere with other statements concerning the actions. Pragmatism, in other words, is a theory of truth that is based on a public acceptance of the truth of statements drawn from all who judge the consequences of human action.

Gregg’s second argument is based on a form of proceduralism.  If all evaluative statements involve indeterminate norms that are inherently controversial, then the first requirement for addressing them is accepting procedures that allow for a dialogue between viewpoints. This does not mean, however, that “localism” – i.e. the justifications for political decisions given within particular communities – must be replaced by universal norms. It is here that the confluence with pragmatism becomes important. 

Gregg proposes an “enlightened localism” that would get around the difficulty of making cogent evaluative statements about the practices in particular communities. If open, mutually accepted procedures are established that allow different communities to dispute the worth of institutions and practices and a pragmatic standard is applied to evaluation, then the problem of establishing normative standards might be at least partially solved. In other words, particular localisms could be normatively defended, if the community involved could establish a pragmatic reason for their practices that could withstand examination within a set of equitable procedures allowing input from other communities.

This does not mean, however, that the actual test would ever take place. Instead, what Gregg seems to be arguing for is a new set of moral sentiments. Instead of appealing to tradition, economic necessity, or political expediency, individuals in particular communities would have to assess the worth of their institutions (or changes in them) by taking into consideration whether others in different situations would find their actions worthwhile. One might call this a “Yeah, Right” test. If a course of action or proposal would be expected to elicit immediate skepticism among members of other communities when presented openly for discussion, then it is normatively questionable. It is the expectation of that reaction and tailoring justifications and actions to meet it that stand at the center of enlightened localism.

If enough members of different communities adopt such a viewpoint, [*20] there is a possibility that a moral consensus will emerge as the political process works. For Gregg, politics is central to establishing and reinforcing enlightened localism. Since determinate, universal norms cannot be established, the political give and take of democratic politics must substitute. That give and take should be conducted openly, allowing all views within a forum. This does not mean, however, that all views will be acceptable. Only those which can be sustained by a pragmatic argument that would have the possibility (but not the guarantee) of creating a consensus could be normatively defended. Such views would be generated by enlightened localism and reinforced by democratic politics.

To see a more concrete example of what Gregg means, we could look at his treatment of education policy. He asserts that an enlightened localism would defer to local interests where possible, in the absence of any determinate norms. This would mean a deferral to community judgments concerning education in so far as they respect the most relevant “localism” of all—the autonomy of individuals. Hence, an enlightened localism would accept variation in educational goals and practices if those practices advance the autonomy of students. We might expect that home schooling would be allowed, but overseen to insure that parochial concerns that seek to limit the knowledge students acquire would not be overriding. The exact mixture of overall controls would be determined by democratic dialogue. Gregg has many similar examples in useful chapters applying his ideas to social critique, public policy, and law and morality.

I found Gregg’s argument for enlightened localism an interesting exercise, but a partially frustrating one. There are two reasons for this. The first involves the claims made for his theory; I am not sure Gregg has solved the dilemmas he says he has. The same question kept bothering me. Let us assume that a pragmatic theory of truth as stated by Gregg is valid and that we will derive the truth of propositions from a public evaluation of consequences. What is to differentiate the truth value of assertions made on the basis of enlightened localism and those made on the basis of universal norms? Take the example above. Is there any practical difference between a policy that regulates home schooling by using a universal norm in favor of rational inquiry and a policy that upholds regulation to promote individual autonomy formed by rational inquiry? There may not be any determinate basis for the universal, but, in terms of policy outcomes, there appears to be little difference to me. I suspect that the parents whose educational efforts are regulated, despite their wishes, would see little to chose as well. Indeed, they might be more mollified by the plain assertion of a universal norm with which they disagree than by a call for them to recognize that diversity must be tempered by maintaining the capacity of citizens to conduct democratic dialogue. I can see where Gregg is going by supporting the latter justification, but I fail to see how, on the basis of his own theory, we can usefully distinguish between the two.

Second, I was also surprised by the inherent conservatism of Gregg’s argument. COPING IN POLITICS is part of the “SUNY series in Radical [*21] Social and Political Theory,” but the basic ideas in the work remind me more of Edmund Burke than anyone else. Like Burke, Gregg is “non-foundational,” respectful of the warp and woof of community life, and reluctant to impose on the way people have arranged their lives unless there is a sound reason for it. Since Gregg is a rationalist, albeit in a limited sense, and a democrat, they would disagree profoundly on how and why to intervene. Further, Gregg’s arguments lead him to propose radical changes in many existing institutions. Still, I think a classic secular conservative would find little to disagree with in his theoretical presentation.

So what is my final word on COPING IN POLITICS? First, I have to warn that this book would only be suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduate students. Gregg’s style is extremely dense and requires a very close reading indeed. Once through and a few notes will not suffice. That said, I think parsing through Gregg’s arguments would be a useful exercise for students of political philosophy and legal theory. The text is a fine example of scholarship in both areas, showing a good grasp of issues and a willingness to grapple with them. Interested academic readers could also find COPING IN POLITICS profitable. As I said at the start of this review, trying to cope with uncertainty in human affairs has been a problem for all scholars. It is refreshing to find someone addressing the normative issues such concerns engender and doing such a systematic job of it. Though I had occasional misgivings about Gregg’s arguments, I was never bored reading this book. There are challenges to unexamined assumptions throughout. It will take me awhile to think them through. That should be recommendation enough. 

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© Copyright 2005 by the author, Tracy Lightcap.