Vol. 11 No. 1 (January 2001) pp. 9-10.

THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: HOW THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CAN TAKE BACK THEIR GOVERNMENT by Richard Labunski. Versailles, KY: Marley and Beck Press, 2000. 577pp. Cloth $29.50. ISBN 0-9677498-7-5.

Reviewed by Paul J. Weber, Department of Political Science, University of Louisville.

When I first read THE SECOND CONVENTION during the summer I immediately rejected its first thesis: that our political system is broken (by campaign finance and fund raising scandals, mainly) and that we face a political crisis. Then came the election of 2000 and I decided I had best wait out the results and rethink my hasty judgment before completing a review. THE SECOND CONVENTION mixes a quite good historical account of the writing of the U. S. Constitution, particularly Article V, and the role of courts in "amending" the constitution through the years, with some breathtaking conclusions and extraordinarily idealistic proposals for change.

For example, after showing that courts can only make incremental changes, the author concludes that, "the American people cannot wait while the courts make incremental modifications to the Constitution one case at a time over many years." (p. 178). One can reasonably ask, why not? There is a good argument that incremental changes, especially when courts rather than legislatures are making them, are more politically palatable than rapid, substantive changes. We do, after all, have the extended backlash to Warren Court decisions as a prime example.

The major thesis, spelled out in the most interesting and innovative section of the book, is that the Internet finally gives the American people an effective, inexpensive means to "take back their government" by organizing local, state and national meetings for the purpose of calling a national constitutional convention. The author's argument that "this could and should be done" left this reviewer wondering where political realism fits in. Sadly, it doesn't. The author has both a Ph.D. in Political Science and a J.D. and he is clearly comfortable in analyzing case law and constitutional history, but he works and writes from a journalistic perspective. He explores what is theoretically possible, even as he acknowledges how very unlikely it is to happen.

Labunski constructs a scenario of how a second convention might come about, proposing that "the effort to amend the Constitution by an Article V Convention will involve at least six stages" not including court challenges (p. 186): (1) a meeting at the congressional district or county level, (2) a state convention, (3) a pre-convention in Washington, (4) a campaign to convince state legislatures to petition Congress to call an Article V Convention, (5) the Convention, and (6) a campaign to get three fourths of state legislatures to ratify the new amendments. Yes, it is theoretically possible for each of these events to happen. However, the chances of fifty states, or even a significant number of them, doing so are so implausible that one hardly knows how to evaluate the proposal. The author is well aware of the long shot nature of his

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proposals. "It is difficult to conceive of a more arduous challenge than for ordinary citizens operating independently of their government to organize a series of meetings culminating in a national convention to propose amendments to the Constitution" (p.187). Indeed.

Of the fifteen chapters, eight set forth and develop arguments for specific amendments the author would like to see approved: campaign finance reform, the equal rights amendment, a crime victims' Bill of Rights, term limits, abolition of the electoral college, protecting the jurisdictional of federal courts, changing how the Constitution is amended, and repealing the second amendment. Although most proposed amendments are unabashedly liberal, and only a few are conservative, all are highly improbable because of the presence of significant opposition in the electorate. What would prevent these same forces that now oppose these initiatives from blocking them during the amendment process?

The final chapter, "If a Second Convention is Never Held" presents something of a hodge-podge of ideas. It repeats the eight guidelines for reasonable amendments proposed by a group founded in 1997 called Citizens for the Constitution, reiterates the author's list of constitutional defects, and appeals to media organizations to "make the public care more about politics and government" (p. 443). However, ultimately he asks, "do people care enough?" He concludes quite realistically that it may take a major disruption to the political or economic system before they do. Nevertheless he argues that writing about a second convention is worthwhile if only as a "reminder that the Constitution belongs not to the Framers who wrote it, or the elected officials who serve under it, but to the people" (p. 444).

My own conclusions, even after following the debacle of the 2000 presidential election are (a) that we have neither a political nor a constitutional crisis that demands a second convention, (b) that if we ever do have such a crisis, citizens will be too divided to approve any of the amendments proposed in this book, and (c) if a major crisis does come, our current processes provide a more effective route to finding a solution than does a second convention.