The Supreme Court: A Concise History.

Vol. 15 No.5 (May 2005), pp.420-424

THE SUPREME COURT: A CONCISE HISTORY, by Robert W. Langran. New York: Peter Lang, 2004. 149pp. Cloth. €56.00 / £40.00 / $55.95. ISBN: 0-8204-7109-7. Paper. €23.00 / £17.00 / $22.95. ISBN: 0-8204-6162-8

Reviewed by Samuel B. Hoff, Department of History, Political Science, and Philosophy, Delaware State University. Email: shoff@desu.edu .

Political Scientist Robert W. Langran has written his second book on the U.S. Supreme Court. In the present offering, he endeavors to “remedy the lack of knowledge and understanding” (Introduction, xi) about the Court by covering its history through a chronological approach. Accordingly, each chapter begins with the justices who served during a particular period in American history, then sequentially examines the most significant cases decided during that era, and ends with a short summary of the span. Three issues are deemed as important to address throughout the book, including the ideology of justices, the level of activism of the Court, and the debate over the Court’s status as a legal or political institution.

Chapter 1 reviews the Supreme Court’s origin and evolution, together with its contemporary structure and operation. Although most of the historical points mentioned are familiar, Langran reveals that “The Court did not even have its own building until 1935” (p.4), most likely a consequence of its perceived status as the least influential branch of American national government. The president’s approval rate in having nominated justices confirmed is about 80 percent. The back-to-back failures of nominees in the Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan administrations are featured, as is the controversial Senate Judiciary Committee hearing which followed the nomination of Clarence Thomas by President George Bush.

Chapters 2 and 3 trace Supreme Court history up to the last year of the Civil War. Langran labels the period which began with the third Chief Justice, John Marshall, as the Marshall era (1801-1835). In the seminal MARBURY v. MADISON decision in 1803, the Court declared part of a federal law unconstitutional for the first time, thereby establishing the power of judicial review at the national level. Subsequently, a series of critical rulings on economic issues, such as contracts, commerce, and banks, were rendered during Marshall’s leadership. Langran confirms Marshall’s enormous impact on the Supreme Court by noting that “he and his colleagues found a body without power and prestige and left it as a force to be reckoned with by all” (p.20).

Marshall was succeeded as Chief Justice by Roger Taney in 1836. During the next twenty-eight years, the Taney Court adopted the doctrine of dual federalism, thus moderating the nationalist tint of the Marshall Court. However, on the issue of slavery the Taney Court took a states’ rights position, exhibited clearly in the infamous DRED SCOTT v. SANFORD ruling in 1857. That decision not only represented the second occasion where the Court had overruled a federal law, [*421] but also “acted as a catalyst for the Civil War” (p.26), according to the author.

Chapters 4 and 5 probe Supreme Court personnel and cases over the seven decades between 1864 and 1933. Following the Civil War, the Court dealt with controversies involving Reconstruction policy, economic issues, and the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Latter nineteenth century rulings possessed a conservative leaning both economically and politically. The Court’s decisions in the CIVIL RIGHTS CASES (1883) and PLESSY v. FERGUSON (1896) upheld states’ views of equal protection, thus perpetuating racial discrimination for another half-century.

During the first three decades of the twentieth century, the Court’s rulings displayed some tolerance for limited government regulation of business. Generally, however, justices continued a conservative orientation in the economic sphere. Similarly, due to the effect of World War I, the Court’s rulings on civil liberties were highly restrictive of individual rights. The exceptions were those instances where the Court incorporated two freedoms found in the Bill of Rights—the First Amendment freedom of speech, and the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure—into the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, thus expanding protection to encompass the state level.

Chapters 6 and 7 highlight the Supreme Court’s personalities and decisions over the twenty-year period from 1933 to 1953. The New Deal policies of President Franklin D. Roosevelt were initially designed to rescue the nation from the grip of the Great Depression. These policies introduced unprecedented government intervention and expansion of the public sector. During FDR’s first term, the Court’s rulings on New Deal controversies went decidedly against the White House. As a result of his frustration, FDR began his second term by seeking to add new judges to the federal court system based on the age of sitting judges. His plan called for a maximum of six additional Supreme Court justices. Though certainly legal, “most people saw it as court-packing and opposed it” (p.50). Still, justices began to uphold New Deal legislation soon thereafter.

As was the case with previous decisions issued during times of major foreign conflict involving the United States, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on civil liberties during World War II. The two most noteworthy examples are the rulings in HIRABAYASHI v. U.S. (1943) and KOREMATSU v. U.S. (1944). In the former case, the Court unanimously upheld a curfew against those of Japanese, German, and Italian ancestry. In the latter, a majority supported a military order to relocate more than 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry from four western states to detention camps. Though perceived as necessary at the time, the action was later discredited by an official apology by the federal government and payment of reparations to the families of those affected. During the Korean conflict in the early 1950’s the Court ruled against an order by President Harry Truman to seize steel mills within the United States to prevent work stoppages. The decision in YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE v. SAWYER (1952) represented a rare rebuke of a president in wartime. [*422]

Chapters 8, 9, and 10 examine Supreme Court personnel and holdings during the half-century between 1953 and 2003, and they consider the roles of Chief Justices Earl Warren (1953-1969), Warren Burger (1969-1986), and William Rehnquist (1986-present), respectively.

Few would dispute the characterization of the Warren Court as the most activist and liberal in American history. Starting with BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1954)—in which the Court unanimously overturned the separate but equal doctrine—the Warren Court tackled a plethora of issues, such as freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly, as well as reapportionment, and rights of the accused. It is in the latter area where the Warren Court had its greatest impact, as evidenced by the MIRANDA v. ARIZONA ruling in 1966. Although subsequent decisions provided exceptions, the basic “MIRANDA rights” procedures which must be used by law enforcement officials when taking a person into custody are still largely in force.

At the outset, Chief Justice Warren Burger appeared to be following in the footsteps of his predecessor, despite having been selected for service by Republican President, Richard Nixon. Decisions upholding busing as a means of achieving racial integration in education (SWANN v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, 1971), in prohibiting prior restraint of the Pentagon Papers—that outlined America’s involvement in the Vietnam War—(NEW YORK TIMES v. U.S., 1971), and in striking down a restrictive state law pertaining to abortion (ROE v. WADE, 1973), seemed to portend continuation of the Warren Court’s liberal bent. But later contradictory rulings on issues encompassing affirmative action, gender equity, and privacy make it difficult to classify the Burger Court ideologically.

In 1986, William Rehnquist became Chief Justice. Just as the Burger Court will always be identified with the U.S. v. NIXON ruling in 1974, so it is hard to imagine a more important holding than BUSH v. GORE, the December 2000 decision ordering a cessation of the recount in Florida following the disputed presidential election outcome. The Supreme Court under Rehnquist has certainly demonstrated a tendency to disagree, with a large number of 5-4 rulings. According to Langran, “[p]robably the best way to characterize this Court is to call it a moderate to conservative Court with a shifting middle, causing it to tender some decisions more moderate in tone than might have been expected” (p.114).

In the concluding chapter, Langran summarizes the ideological development of the Supreme Court and its justices and predicts future tendencies. These trends include maintenance of conservative rulings in cases dealing with rights of the accused and First Amendment issues, inconsistent decisions on equal protection matters, and a tilt toward states’ rights in federalism controversies. Langran observes that “[n]o matter what happens, the Court will generally be in step with the public mood, and it will continue in its role as the guardian of our liberties” (p.123).

A range of books have been published analyzing the dynamics of the Supreme [*423] Court from a process perspective, from the standpoint of justices, or by combining cases in a topical issue format. Few studies have utilized a sequential method for evaluating decisions; the ones available which have done so are usually accompanied by other material. Three texts are identified as having some similarity with the Langran work. In his 1966 study, Arthur North juxtaposes a discussion of the Court’s procedures with that of the development of the Bill of Rights. In his 1987 book, Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist devotes a significant section to reviewing the Court’s history from the perspective of individual justices and Court membership as a whole. Because he adopts both of these tactics, Sanford Levinson’s 2000 revision of Robert McCloskey’s book, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT, is closest to the Langran study, albeit more than 100 pages longer and containing a dateline of Supreme Court events and decisions not found in Langran.

The Langran book is well-structured for its intended market: undergraduate courses in political science generally, and American government in particular. The work contains helpful appendices depicting the federal court structure and identifying each Supreme Court Justice by time of service and by the nominating president. The concluding chapter’s forecast of the Court’s direction seems plausible. However, the book’s purposeful brevity is at once a benefit and bane. First, the author veers from the method of detailing the Court’s evolution by highlighting the justices who led it. Langran joins the vast majority of scholars who cite the “superstar” chief justices while ignoring the less well-known ones. Second, the tactic of covering the Court’s development from a chronological case approach produces instances of laundry list-type passages without an evaluation of case impact one the one hand, and subject categorization of cases without subsequent delineation of how certain decisions were reversed or revised on the other.

Still, Langran achieves his objective of revealing some of the roles of law and politics in the U.S. Supreme Court throughout its existence.

REFERENCES:

McCloskey, Robert G. and Sanford Levinson. 2000. THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

North, Arthur A. 1966. THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLITICS. NY: Meredith.

Rehnquist, William H. 1987. THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS. New York: William Morrow and Company.

CASE REFERENCES:

BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

BUSH v. GORE, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

CIVIL RIGHTS CASES, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

HIRABAYASHI v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 (1943).

KOREMATSU v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). [*424]

MARBURY v. MADISON, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

NEW YORK TIMES v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

PLESSY v. FERGUSON, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

ROE v. WADE, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

SCOTT v. SANFORD, 19 How. 393 (1857).

SWANN v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

U.S. v. NIXON, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE v. SAWYER, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

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