Vol. 16 No.1 (January 2006), pp.4-6

 

DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS:  THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN FEDERAL COURT, by Susan Gluck Mezey.  Pittsburgh, PA:  University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005.  248pp.  Paper. $27.95. ISBN:  0-8229-5879-1. 

 

Reviewed by Staci L. Beavers, Political Science Department, California State University San Marcos.  Email:  sbeavers [at] csusm.edu

 

With DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS:  THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN FEDERAL COURT, political scientist Susan Gluck Mezey provides a well organized, thorough review of the federal judiciary’s interpretations of 1990’s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  Her thesis, that the federal courts have narrowed the scope and potential impact of this once-promising civil rights legislation through “‘textualist’” readings of the statute (p.8), will not be easily challenged, and her analysis of cases from across the federal judiciary provides both qualitative and quantitative evidence that the ADA’s impact has been hampered by a federal judiciary intent on limiting the law’s meaning and applicability. 

 

The book, which seeks to “bridg[e] the gap between law and public policy,” (p.5), is well-organized.  The legislation’s major components are briefly spelled out in the Introduction:  Title I focuses on employment discrimination against persons with disabilities; Title II addresses “the delivery of state and local government services, including public transportation” (p.2); Title III addresses public accommodations; and Title IV deals with telecommunications (p.2). 

 

Chapter 2’s discussion of “Disability Rights as Civil Rights” provides an excellent introduction to the topic, situating disability rights firmly in the framework of prior civil rights litigation and legislation and providing significant legislative history regarding the ADA’s ultimate passage in 1990.  Mezey gives substantial attention to what may be the most significant disability rights laws prior to passage of the ADA:  the Rehabilitation Act, first passed in 1973, and the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, first passed in 1975 and now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (pp.11-18).  In addition, drawing upon work by several scholars, such as Katzman (1986), Mezey strives to make clear that the Supreme Court’s apparent antipathy to disability rights dates back at least to interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act (e.g., SOUTHEASTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGE v. DAVIS, 1979) (pp.18-19).   

 

Chapter 2 is followed sequentially by chapters exploring federal litigation regarding Titles I, II, and III of the ADA; in each area, Mezey successfully demonstrates how this potentially expansive, ground-breaking civil rights litigation has been restricted by the Supreme Court, and by lower-level federal judges.  Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contain qualitative as well as basic quantitative data to demonstrate just how well defendants – i.e., alleged violators [*5] of the ADA – have fared in this field of litigation. 

 

Chapter 6 is devoted to “new federalism” jurisprudence, focusing specifically on that litigation which has broadened the states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity protection.  While giving attention to TENNESSEE v. LANE (2004), in which the Supreme Court allowed a Title II suit against the State of Tennessee for not guaranteeing sufficient “physical access to courtrooms” (p.164), Mezey clearly demonstrates how BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA v. GARRETT (2001), a Title I decision denying a state employee the right to sue her employer for monetary damages (pp.150-153), fits into the broader field of the Court’s sovereign immunity doctrine.  As she states the matter, “Whatever its motivation, in advancing the principle of state sovereignty, frequently by enhancing the immunity defense offered by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has diminished Congress’s authority to enforce federal civil rights laws,” including the ADA (p.142).  

 

Fundamentally, Mezey blames restrictive judicial interpretations of the ADA on the “textualist” jurisprudence of several Supreme Court justices as well as numerous lower court judges.  She asserts that such judges have understood a law intended to be “broadly applied” (p.3) in an unnecessarily restrictive way by focusing closely on the language in the statute and negating more expansive interpretations suggested by the bill’s legislative history, including floor speeches and committee documents created during passage.  The result has been limited readings of the conditions that qualify as “disabilities” and actions that constitute violations of the civil rights of the disabled.  For example, though disability rights supporters have scored some victories – such as the Supreme Court’s declaration in BRAGDON v. ABBOTT (1998) that HIV-positive status qualifies for ADA coverage (pp.115-117) – plaintiffs asserting ADA violations have fared particularly poorly in Title I (employment) cases, with defendants being told that they do not have a “disability” under ADA and thus may not benefit from the law’s protections (e.g., SUTTON v. UNITED AIR LINES, 1999) (pp.48-53).  And, although the federal courts have been more open to plaintiffs’ arguments in cases addressing Titles II and III, even these victories have been tempered by the courts’ limited readings of the legislation (pp.108, 115). 

 

Mezey does acknowledge Congress’ need to bear some of the blame for the judiciary’s interpretation of the ADA by its allowances for possible defenses in the text of the legislation itself: “unlike the civil rights laws of the 1960s and 1970s, the ADA explicitly allows cost and reasonableness to be interposed as defenses in litigation. Consequently, the rights guaranteed in the law are balanced against an unspecified monetary and social cost so that discrimination is permissible if the price for relief is too great” (p.166).  Additionally, Congress has yet to override the federal courts’ statutory interpretations by passing more expansively worded disability rights statutes to protect rights denied in the federal courts (p.58).  

 

Mezey marshals a range of sources in her analysis.  Although judicial opinions from [*6] across the federal courts provide the bulk of her evidence, she also presents data from congressional debates and interviews with numerous disability rights supporters, including several who urged the enactment of the ADA (p.5), to support her contention that the federal courts have rendered the Act more limited than intended by its congressional supporters. 

 

The most significant weakness of the book is probably that it presents few surprises, and many of its arguments largely confirm previous findings by other scholars.  For example, most of Chapter 3’s quantitative data are drawn primarily from previously published sources, including Colker (2001).  In succeeding chapters, Mezey acknowledges that her quantitative data generally support and update the findings of previous authors. 

 

On the whole, DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS presents a thorough picture of the breadth, scope, and tenor of the federal judiciary’s approach to this landmark legislation.  Mezey successfully makes the case that the ADA has been read narrowly by federal judges at all levels, resulting in rights for the disabled that fall short of the mark intended by members of Congress when they passed the statute. 

 

REFERENCES:

Colker, Ruth.  2001.  “Winning and Losing under the Americans with Disabilities Act.” 62 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 239-78.

 

Katzman, Robert.  1986.  INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY.  Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution.

 

CASE REFERENCES:

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA v. GARRETT, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).

 

BRAGDON v. ABBOTT, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).

 

SOUTHEASTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGE v. DAVIS, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).

 

SUTTON v. UNITED AIRLINES, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).

 

TENNESSEE v. LANE, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).

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© Copyright 2006 by the author, Staci L. Beavers.