ISSN 1062-7421
Vol. 11 No. 12 (December 2001) pp. 589-591.

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY by Peter H. Russell and David M. O'Brien (Editors). Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001. 320 pp. Cloth $70.00. ISBN: 0-8319-2015-9. Paper $22.50. 0-8139-2016-7.

Reviewed by Nancy Maveety, Department of Political Science, Tulane University

Having just completed the production of an edited volume, I have gained a new appreciation for the work such labors entail--and a new appreciation for the qualities good examples of such labors should entail. Thematic coherence, unity of purpose, and symmetry of contributions are these qualities. Happily, I can report that Russell and O'Brien's new volume achieves these, although is also adds basic factual information and critical commentary on the world's judicial systems. It is a distinguished complement to the emerging literature on comparative courts in the fields of political science and law.

The book succeeds because of the efforts of the editors to structure their authors' chapters around a single, shared focus: the nature of judicial independence, both institutional and operational, and the consideration of structural and political factors that enhance or compromise this independence. Russell contributes a useful introductory chapter that serves as a frame for the book and a reference point for individual chapters; he supplies a theoretical framework defining judicial independence and explaining its purpose. Nothing here is earth-shatteringly new, but Russell is systematic in addressing the dimensions of independence, speaking of it "as a relational term." For me, most suggestive was his distinction between EXTERNAL and INTERNAL controls and influences. Helpful for students and
scholars are the definitional categories he derives from this distinction. "The external category," Russell explains, "refers to all of those forces--governmental and nongovernmental, public and private--outside of the judiciary itself that can encroach on the autonomy of the judiciary collectively or of the individual judge. This," he observed, "is the most widely recognized dimension of judicial independence and embraces what is normally meant by the separation of powers" (p. 11). However, Russell's introduction, and Russell and O'Brien's volume, do not limit themselves to consideration of this most familiar constitutional dimension. "The internal
dimension [of judicial independence]," Russell continues, "refers to sources of influence and control within the judiciary itself," and focuses on the independence of the individual judge in the judicial hierarchy. Thus, the introductory chapter and subsequent contributors' chapters expand the book's examination to matters of judicial administration and to the practical, often somewhat prosaic but essential level of judicial autonomy and capacity to adjudicate.

Henry Abraham's chapter on the American judiciary offers a template for U. S. scholars to appraise questions of judicial independence comparatively. He succinctly reviews familiar historical episodes in the establishment of the American vision of an independent, impartial judiciary and the rule

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of law, suggesting that, "emerging nations may well view [this vision] as a possible model" (p. 36). Subsequent chapters on non-U. S. judicial systems make use of the American model as a comparative reference, often for heuristic purposes. What unites Abraham's comments and those chapters addressing the political discourse about judicial independence around the world is the realization, reiterated in Russell's concluding remarks, "that judicial independence is never a condition that is established fully of that is enjoyed without controversy or challenge" (p. 301).

Indeed, the volume's strength is in stressing what is common. Just as constitutional democracies, new and old, are experiencing a growth in the power of the judiciary, so too are court scholars more fully aware "of how dependent a variable judicial independence is" (p. 307). Shared concerns and themes drive the authors' consideration of judicial systems as disparate as those of Japan, Russia, Germany, Israel, and El Salvador. Area specialists from regions as diverse as Eastern Europe, the Far East, and Latin America will find chapters that usefully supplement their studies of legislative or interest group politics. Judicial specialists concerned with democratic transition and consolidation will find meaningful comparisons drawn between judicial systems challenged in different ways to cement judicial independence and constitutional democracy. Significantly, the judicial systems of mature democracies such as England, Australia, and Germany are addressed in light of the same variables affecting judicial independence as those of emergent democracies or emerging intergovernmental and quasi-federalist associations-- i.e. the European Union. Such unity of analytical focus serves the reader concerned with the phenomenon of judicial independence, and aids the reader in digesting analyses of unfamiliar states and their judiciaries.

Those readers cognizant of the scholarship on non-U. S. courts will encounter familiar authors presenting incisive accounts: A. E. Dick Howard, Donald Kommers, Martin Shapiro, J. Michael Dodson and Donald Jackson. Those readers new to the comparative courts field will be engaged by the interesting portraits drawn of judicial systems which vary rather dramatically from that of the U. S., with those of Japan, Russian, Latin Western Europe, and Israel were particularly thought provoking. Although some chapters err on the side of a "just the facts," formalistic approach, others are theoretically stimulating and substantively more sound. Such
variety is the case with any edited volume, and such an apprehension of the contents depends on the individual interests and tastes of the individual reader. However, the overall strength of the volume is the degree to which it succeeds in viewing its many, varied cases through a single theoretical lens--that of judicial independence, in theory and in practice.

I recommend the book to those judicial scholars interested in broadening their knowledge of a range of judicial systems, and to those scholars interested in thinking systematically about a single behavioral dimension of the judicial process from a comparative perspective. I would also recommend the book for use in undergraduate judicial process courses: each author provides a basis sketch of the political system in which the judiciary under consideration is situated, and each chapter offers valuable background material from which students might extend their investigations to a sophisticated research paper. All the chapters are readable and

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engaging, even to those with little initial interest in the country discussed. My own particular favorite was Todd Fogelson's chapter on judicial independence in Russia: this may reflect may own current, regional concerns, or my own idiosyncratic preference for dysfunctional institutional orders. Other readers may find specific connections with other chapters. However,on the whole, I can say this about JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY. I learned something from reading its chapters, and it inspired me to think further about the nature of judicial independence, and about the institutional rules and norms that condition its operation.

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Copyright 2001 by the author, Nancy Maveety.