Vol. 5 No. 4 (April, 1995) pp. 137-140
MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936-1961, by Mark V. Tushnet. New York: Oxford University Press,
1994. 399pp. $35.00.
Reviewed by Joel B. Grossman, University of Wisconsin-Madison
This is a fascinating narrative history of the efforts by
Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to reshape the
meaning of the equal protection clause and harness it in the
struggle for racial equality. Based on prodigious research, and
relying on original sources as well as interviews with many of
the key figures involved, Tushnet, himself a former law clerk for
Justice Marshall, shows in painstaking detail how the LDF
gradually led the Supreme Court to abandon Jim Crow and the
pernicious doctrine of "separate but equal." The use of
litigation in behalf of civil rights had begun before Marshall
entered the scene in the 1930s, but it was his determined
leadership that led to the most important constitutional decision
of the twentieth century, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1954,55).
Of course BROWN was initially limited to the question of de jure
school segregation. But the idea of equality, once set loose from
its nineteenth century restraints and the barnacles of adverse
constitutional precedents, proved impossible to contain. It
spread rapidly to all walks of American life, and soon was
recognized as one of the defining (but also most contentious)
principles of our legal and political culture.
Marshall left the LDF in 1961 to accept President Kennedy's
appointment to the Court of Appeals. President Johnson appointed
him as Solicitor General in 1965, and then elevated him to the
Supreme Court in 1967 -- he first justice of African descent. On
the Court he would play a major role in the next, and much more
difficult, phase of the civil rights struggle -- the struggle to
define the meaning of constitutional equality and to whom it
applied, and to implement its commands in a society much more
comfortable with the idea than the reality. Tushnet's book does
not extend to this second phase of Marshall's career (one hopes
for a second volume that does), but it effectively reveals the
qualities of mind and heart and speech that produced one of our
greatest public advocates.
Quite apart from the richly detailed discussion of cases and
other legal events, the book has several themes. One, reflected
in the title,"Makinq Civil Rights Law" is that the
modern equal protection clause didn't just arrive by
constitutional stork. It took enormous effort and leadership to
turn the Court away from its civil rights complacency and toward
a rejection of separate-but-equal as an acceptable interpretation
of equal protection. But even such leadership could not have
succeeded without the major changes in racial attitudes -- by
blacks and whites -- brought about by World War II, without the
mass migration and the post-industrial revolution that sapped the
vitality of a disappearing economic order, and without the
recognition that segregation undermined American efforts to be a
major player in world politics. Legal doctrine doesn't often
respond quickly to social change.
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It was part of Marshall's genius to recognize that even
incremental legal change required extraordinary attention to
detail and patience, and an abiding faith in the law as a
necessary if not sufficient mechanism for social change. The
author's emphasis on civil rights law is also appropriate; it
reminds us of the gap between law as a precondition, or even
guarantor, of civil rights, and the actual realization of those
rights either by the named plaintiffs or by blacks as a class.
Marshall, of course, understood that gap all to well. One could
compile a long list of cases that Marshall and his colleagues
nominally "won" that did not yield immediate payoffs.
But the fruits of those decisions, individually and cumulatively,
would eventually be realized.
A second theme of the book, prefaced in Tushnet's earlier work on
the NAACP, is the complexity and environmental/political nuances
of litigation strategy: the need to respond to the often
conflicting goals of theoretically allied organizations; the
necessity of controlling grass roots litigation efforts in order
to shape cases properly for Supreme Court review by the LDF; the
need to harness public support; and the problems of
implementation. The twenty year campaign to attack housing
discrimination, for example, was nearly unhinged when the Supreme
Court focused primarily on SHELLEY V. KRAEMER (1954) rather than
on another case that the LDF preferred. The LDF only reluctantly
became involved in defending the sit-in protesters in the 1960s.
Marshall believed that such demonstrations undermined the goal of
constitutional reform, but quickly recognized that the onset of
the civil rights revolution, and the evolution of more activist
strategies, had changed the game and could not be ignored in the
legal arena. The great victory in SHELLEY would have meant little
without follow up efforts to bar the use of racial restrictive
covenants -- to which Marshall devoted considerable time. Indeed,
as Tushnet notes, Marshall spent increasing amounts of time on
the political side of civil rights, and correspondingly less on
litigation; it was his own personal evolution from civil rights
lawyer to civil rights leader.
Tushnet's description of the LDF's strategy in the school
segregation cases is particularly insightful. He shows how
Marshall devised the LDF strategy to secure the elimination of
the separate-but-equal doctrine by arguing that PLESSY was
morally bankrupt and legally unacceptable, and not consistent
with the modern meaning of the 14th Amendment, and that
segregation should be ended forthwith, while at the same time
recognizing that the decision he sought depended on meeting the
doctrinal preferences of a number of justices. Frankfurter,
especially, sought a decision that permitted at least a modicum
of discretion and gradualism by the southern states in
implementing the BROWN decision (believing, somewhat naively,
that compliance would follow). But it was not so much anything
Marshall said or did that brought about the favorable result as
Earl Warren's fortuitous appointment as chief justice, and his
commitment to ending segregation and skillful leadership in
forging a unanimous decision that was unequivocal in principle if
more flexible as to remedy.
Tushnet also sheds additional light on the controversy over
William Rehnquist's role, as Jackson's clerk, in influencing
Jackson's willingness to overturn PLESSY. In a memorandum to
Jackson that surfaced when Rehnquist himself was nominated to the
Court
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by Richard Nixon in 1970, Rehnquist appeared, at least to his
adversaries, to be urging Jackson to reaffirm PLESSY as sound
law. At the level of ideology, the memorandum also strongly
criticizes Jackson's liberal colleagues and compares the
anti-Plessy sentiment to the discredited LOCHNER decision. In
response to these allegations Rehnquist said that the memorandum
did not reflect his own views, but was written, at Jackson's
behest, to articulate Jackson's views. Many thought Rehnquist was
not truthful, but with Jackson long dead, there was no way to
corroborate either interpretation.
When Rehnquist was nominated by Ronald Reagan to be chief justice
in 1986, the issue arose again, and Rehnquist and his opponents
repeated their earlier claims. Richard Kluger's definitive study
of the BROWN cases, SIMPLE JUSTICE, had essentially agreed with
Rehnquist's opponents that the views expressed by the memorandum
were Rehnquist's rather than Jackson's. Tushnet argues that the
memorandum did express some of Jackson's ambivalence on how to
deal with a venerable precedent. But he notes that Jackson never
supported reaffirmation of PLESSY, and that his reservations
about the matter went to whether or not (and how) PLESSY should
be overruled. Thus, in Tushnet's judgment, " . . . the
memorandum, while expressing one aspect of Jackson's views, is
put in ways that strongly suggest that it expresses all of
Rehnquist's. . . .the memorandum speaks in Rehnquist's voice
rather than Jackson's." But apart from the ideological
overtones which were peripheral to the main issue and clearly
reflected Rehnquist's paranoia about a liberal conspiracy of law
clerks on the Court, Tushnet concludes that the memorandum
"is precisely the kind of argument Jackson would have made
-- part of the time." (p. 351, n. 9) Absent a deathbed
confession, the exact truth of the matter will never be known.
But Tushnet's interpretation is typically careful and fair
minded. And it is a textbook lesson about the evolution of
constitutional doctrine and the interplay of justices and their
clerks.
Thurgood Marshall's influence on constitutional law was probably
greater as a lawyer than as a justice. As head of the LDF he led
a constitutional revolution. As a member of an increasingly
conservative Court, he labored, with great frustration and
increasing irritation, to blunt the backlash against that
revolution. But as his influence on constitutional doctrine
ebbed, his rhetoric flowed. Perhaps, like the first Justice
Harlan's memorable dissent in PLESSY, Thurgood Marshall's words,
his essential optimism, and his commitment to the constitution
and the law, will someday be brought back to life in
post-Gingrich America. Marshall argued, during the 1987
bicentennial, that the original constitution was not worth
celebrating, that "the true miracle of the constitution was
not its birth but its life." It was the 14th Amendment which
afforded a basis for the promise of progress toward justice and
equality. It is a promise not yet (and perhaps never to be) fully
realized. For Marshall, however, the key was the progress that
had been made and his belief that, over time, there would be
more: "Negroes," he said, "were enslaved by law,
emancipated by law, disenfranchised and segregated by law; and,
finally, they have begun to win equality by law" (p. 5).
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References:
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 443 (1953).
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
PLESSY V. FERGUSON, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Kluger, Richard. 1975. SIMPLE JUSTICE. New York: Vintage Books.
Copyright 1995