Division and Discord: The Supreme Court Under Stone and
Vinson, 1941-1953 by Melvin I. Urofsky. Columbia, SC: University
of
South Carolina Press, 1997. 314 pp. Cloth. $39.95.
Review by Harold J. Spaeth, Department of Political Science,
Michigan State University.
This book is a conventional history of the Stone and Vinson
Courts. It is one of a series on Chief Justiceships of the U.S.
Supreme Court under the general editorship of Herbert A. Johnson.
For those unacquainted with this period or for those who want a
convenient reference, Urofsky's work is adequate. Although the
author references his material to the full range of existing
legal and historical sources -- including the private papers of
Black, Burton, Douglas, Frankfurter, Jackson, Reed, Rutledge, and
Stone -- he totally omits scientific work from his purview. One
perhaps should not expect more from a constitutional historian.
But the price, of course, is a rehash. Urofsky merely recounts
the story of these two Courts without the benefit of a new or
fresh analysis.
Given its limited focus, the book contains little about which
to cavil. Urofsky opens his preface with the statement that "The
period between the great Constitutional crisis of 1937 and the
ascension of Earl Warren to the chief justiceship in 1937 is not
one that has received a great deal of attention." Excluding the
basically hagiographic biographies, one can point to Pritchett's
two books and that of Palmer as evidence to the contrary.
Urofsky, however, appears to have no particular axe to
grind. He is willing to make unflattering references to his
subjects, Frankfurter especially. Thus, "Like his friend and
ally, William O. Douglas, Black had little use for precedent" (p.
17); Frankfurter's rage at the failure of the other justices to
follow his lead often turned splenetic. . . . Frankfurter
sometimes addressed Murphy as 'Dear God'" (p. 34); "Within the
Court, Frankfurter's temper grew shorter and his invective more
vitriolic. He began to talk about 'enemies' on the bench . . .
He referred derisively to Black, Douglas, and Murphy as 'the
Axis'" (p. 40); "By the end of the war the normal level of polite
give-and-take within the Court had been poisoned by the ongoing
feuding among Frankfurter, Roberts, and Jackson on one side and
Black, Douglas, and Murphy on the other" (p. 137).
Urofsky begins his chronicle with brief characterizations of
the Stone Court justices. He follows it with chapters on the
Court at war, the expansion of individual rights, the federal
system, the transition from war to peace, the Cold War, rights of
labor, incorporation and due process, and the road to Brown. Of
these, I found the chapter on the federal system the best.
Brandeis' labors to lessen the incidence of forum shopping
finally bore fruit in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938). On the
other hand, Erie's impact has subsequently been vitiated by
federal statutes that have superseded state laws in many areas
and by state adoption of proposals by the Commission on Uniform
State Laws, most notably the UCC. Urofsky also nicely treats the
Court's application of the full faith and credit clause to the
quickie divorces of Nevada and Florida.
In sum, this well-written book has utility for students and
lay persons curious about the history of the Stone and Vinson
Courts. Its value for political scientists is, however, minimal.
REFERENCES
ERIE RAILROAD V. TOMPKINS. 1938. 304 U.S. 64.
Palmer, Jan. 1990. THE VINSON COURT ERA. New York: AMS Press.
Pritchett, C. Herman. 1948. THE ROOSEVELT COURT. New York: Macmillan.
_______. 1954. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT. Chicago:University
of
Chicago.